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1091 
Negativing Invention 
Jacob S. Sherkow 
Since 1952, the patent statute has forbidden courts from 
discriminating against, or “negativing,” inventions according to how 
they were made, be it “long toil and experimentation” or a “flash of 
genius.” Now, in addressing whether an invention is “obvious,” courts 
must only examine whether the invention was obvious according to the 
arts pertinent to that invention—the “analogous” rather than 
“nonanalogous” arts. This article shows that this dichotomy has actually 
promoted method-of-invention discrimination in patent law because 
the subjectivity of the analogous art inquiry has increasingly 
“analogized” wide fields of prior art as technology has progressed. This, 
in turn, has the effect of “negativing” inventions made by “long toil 
and experimentation” relative to “flash of genius” inventions because 
the latter are more capable of drawing upon disparate arts less 
susceptible to analogizing. This article further examines the 
consequences of this effect as “negativing” the underlying policy 
justifications for the patent monopoly and concludes by calling for a 
more cabined approach to the analogous art inquiry. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are many ways to invent something, from the whimsical—
“by accident, by a vision in a dream, by a sudden flash of genius”1—
to the laborious—“long toil and experimentation.”2 In 1952, 
Congress attempted to end a century-old debate as to whether 
patents should exclusively favor one method over the other. In the 
newly crafted nonobviousness statute, Congress allowed inventions 
created by all means to be brought before the Patent Office, 
famously declaring: “Patentability shall not be negatived by the 
manner in which the invention was made.”3 Whether this is, in fact, 
how the statute truly operates has been thus far untested in legal 
scholarship. Interestingly, a closer examination of the operation of 
the nonobviousness statute suggests that, despite the statutory 
directive, patent law continues to discriminate against particular 
methods of invention. This Article examines how the 
nonobviousness inquiry’s use of prior art references favors inventions 
 
 1. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. ConAgra, Inc., Nos. 94-1247, 94-1248, 1994 WL 
712488, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 1994). 
 2. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2006) (1952 Historical and Revision Notes). 
 3. Id. § 103(a). 
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conceived under more whimsical methods, such as a “flash of 
genius,” over laborious ones, despite Congress’s intent to the 
contrary. 
Prior to 1952, the patent statute generally required inventions to 
possess only two characteristics: novelty (whether an identical 
invention had been previously made) and utility (whether the 
invention had any practical use).4 The legislature and the judiciary, 
however, believed that these requirements were insufficient to ensure 
that patents would not be awarded to less-than-patent-worthy 
inventions. Consequently, both institutions attempted to enact or 
read into the patent statute a third patentability requirement that 
focused on the invention’s “inventiveness.”5 Neither of these proved 
workable, and in 1941 Congress set to work on crystallizing a third 
statutory requirement to patentability6 after the Supreme Court 
invalidated a patent because the invention failed to “reveal the flash 
of creative genius”7—a decision that was roundly condemned.8  
In 1952, Congress enacted the nonobviousness statute, which 
denied patentability to inventions that “would have been obvious at 
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in 
the art to which said subject matter pertains.”9 Further, in an effort 
to guarantee patents to all manners of inventions, the statute 
commanded that “[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the 
 
 4. See id. § 103 (1952 Historical and Revision Notes); see generally John F. Duffy, 
Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2007) (recounting 
the invention of the nonobviousness statute in 1952). 
 5. Duffy, supra note 4, at 22. In 1790, Thomas Jefferson had attempted to introduce 
language in the original Patent Act that denied patents to “unimportant and obvious” 
inventions, but he did so “only tentatively—this particular defense was set off in parentheses in 
Jefferson’s draft” of the Act. Id. at 36 (citing Thomas Jefferson, Draft of a Bill to Promote the 
Progress of the Useful Arts (Feb. 7, 1791), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 
1788–1792, at 278–80 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895)). In 1793, Congress amended the 
patent statute to prohibit the patenting of inventions that merely changed the “form or 
proportions” of old inventions. Id. This “statutory exception” planted the seed that gave rise 
to a third patentability requirement but was “very gradual and not noticed by all.” Id. at 38. 
The language was removed altogether in 1836. Id. at 34. In 1822, the Supreme Court 
required patentable inventions to embody a change “in [the] principle” of prior inventions. 
Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 431 (1822). And in 1850, the Court further required inventions 
to show a “degree of skill and ingenuity.” Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850). 
 6. Giles S. Rich, Why & How Section 103 Came to Be, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 181, 186–87 
(2005).  
 7. Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91–92 (1941). 
 8. See infra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
 9. 35 U.S.C.A § 103(a).  
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manner in which the invention was made.”10 The Revision Notes 
explained that this requirement made “immaterial whether [the 
invention] resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a 
flash of genius.”11 Scholars then and since have heralded the 
importance of this change.12 
Yet all of this praise has glossed over an “obvious” question: Is 
the process of invention truly immaterial? Or do the federal courts 
favor one method of invention, say, a flash of genius, over another, 
such as long toil and experimentation? An examination of how the 
courts determine which prior art is “the art to which [the] subject 
matter [of the invention] pertains”13 proves insightful. 
Courts have traditionally set to this task by dividing prior art 
references into “analogous” and “nonanalogous” art. Generally, 
courts use analogous arts against the invention sought to be patented 
in nonobviousness inquiries, while they do not do so with 
nonanalogous arts.14 As this article will show, the delineation 
between analogous and nonanalogous arts is not clear. Since the 
passage of the nonobviousness statute, the Federal Circuit and its 
predecessor court have provided little workable guidance on the 
methodology for making this determination.15 As technology has 
progressed, the subjectivity of the “analogous arts test” has caused 
 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. (1952 Historical and Revision Notes).  
 12. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 1–2 (quoting ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN 
FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 612 (4th ed. 2007); NONOBVIOUSNESS—
THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980); FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 2 (2003)) (calling the statute “legal innovation” and 
highlighting several monikers of the nonobviousness statute as given by other scholars: the 
“‘final gatekeeper of the patent system,’ the ‘ultimate condition of patentability,’ and ‘the heart 
of patent law’”); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2063 (2007) 
(concluding that the nonobviousness statute “balance[s] the public’s interest in preventing the 
spurious issue of patents with the public’s competing interests in rewarding innovation and in 
receiving disclosure of nonobvious inventions”); Giles S. Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of 
Words—Is Evolution in Legal Thinking Possible?, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 193, 206 (2005) (calling 
the statute “an evolution in legal thinking”). 
 13. See 35 U.S.C.A § 103(a). 
 14. See, e.g., Regent Lighting Corp. v. FL Indus., Inc., No. 94-1162, 1995 WL 
331122, at *4 (Fed. Cir. June 2, 1995) (“The Thomas references are within the inventor's 
field of endeavor, in view of what is claimed, and are accordingly relevant prior art. The 
Thomas references are therefore relevant to the consideration of obviousness under § 103 and 
are not ‘nonanalogous.’”). 
 15. See infra notes 124–148 and accompanying text. 
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courts to widen the scope of analogous arts, a result of the increasing 
interdisciplinarity of the “subject matter” of many inventions.16 This 
has not had a neutral effect on the method of invention. Rather, this 
“analogizing” of prior art has favored “flash of genius” inventions, 
which often draw on multiple, disparate disciplines less susceptible to 
analogizing, over “long toil and experimentation” inventions, which 
typically require basic research in a related field.17 This style of 
“analogizing” has the effect of “negativing” inventions according to 
the manner in which they were made.18 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the history of 
nonobviousness and the waxing and waning focus on the method of 
invention. Part III examines courts’ applications of nonobviousness 
through their characterization of analogous versus nonanalogous 
arts, demonstrating courts’ increasingly expansive views of pertinent 
arts for nonobviousness determinations. Part III then explains that 
this expansive view results in a focus on the method of invention 
despite Congress’s attempt to eliminate such a requirement. Part IV 
discusses several problems inherent in the courts’ expansive 
allowance of pertinent arts for nonobviousness determinations. 
Specifically, it disfavors inventions of precision, discourages 
inventions that have unpredictable synergistic effects, and runs 
counter to the principal purpose of the patent monopoly—letting 
inventors recoup the costs of invention—by favoring creative and 
largely cost-free synthesizers over diligent and more cost-prone 
inventors operating in a narrow field. Part V concludes by suggesting 
that a more constrained interpretation of the pertinent arts in 
nonobviousness determinations better aligns with the purpose of the 
nonobviousness statute. 
II. THE HISTORY OF NONOBVIOUSNESS AND THE METHOD OF 
INVENTION 
A. The First Patent Systems 
A review of the history of the nonobviousness requirement shows 
a focus on the method, not merely the product, of invention. The 
world’s first patent system, as we would consider one today, began in 
 
 16. See infra notes 148–179 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 180–220 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 220–279 and accompanying text.  
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Venice, Italy in the early- to mid-fifteenth century.19 The Venetian 
Republic, one of the precursor states to modern Italy, granted 
monopolies to inventors for industrial devices and processes.20 By 
1474, Venice had passed the world’s first patent statute, the 
Venetian Act of March 19, 1474.21 The requirements were, by 
modern standards, low: an inventor could obtain a monopoly if the 
device or process was a new and useful invention. And, in a precursor 
to the nonobviousness statute, the Venetian Act demanded that the 
invention was the result of the inventor’s “‘skill and experience,’ 
‘pertinent thoughts and labors,’ or ‘efforts of study and 
ingenuity.’”22 
The Venetian Act contained many facets of a modern patent 
system: a cursory application process, a simple administrative 
examination, a remedy for infringement, and an allowance for 
licenses.23 The Venetian Act also had a primordial nonobviousness 
requirement: it restricted patentability to only “ingenious” 
inventions.24 What constituted an “ingenious” invention, however, is 
not entirely clear, and there is little in the way of medieval Venetian 
scholarship to explain.25 At least one scholar in the field has argued 
that the “ingenuity” stricture of the Venetian Act required the 
invention to “not be a trifling, all too obvious application of known 
technology.”26 Other scholars have rejected this interpretation and 
instead focused on “the moral significance of [the] labor” involved 
in producing the invention.27 
 
 19. Duffy, supra note 4, at 21–23; Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, 
Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 223, 233–37 
(2006). 
 20. Duffy, supra note 4, at 21–23. 
 21. Id. at 22; Nard & Morriss, supra note 19, at 234. 
 22. Duffy, supra note 4, at 21–22 (quoting Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450–
1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 173–75 (1948)). 
 23. Id. at 22; Nard & Morris, supra note 19, at 234 (“[T]o paraphrase the noted 
American philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, all Western patent systems consist of but a 
series of footnotes to the Venetian patent statute.”). 
 24. Duffy, supra note 4, at 22 (“An embryonic requirement of nonobviousness or 
inventiveness also seems to appear, for the statute requires the device to be a ‘new and 
ingenious device’—in the original Italian, ‘nuovo et ingegnoso artifico.’”). 
 25. See generally Mandich, supra note 22. 
 26. Id. at 177. 
 27. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550-
1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1257 (2001). 
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The debate is interesting, though, for another reason: even the 
first nonobviousness requirement contained a subtle 
acknowledgement of the different methods of invention. An 
ingenuity requirement that focused on whether an invention was 
trivial, or an obvious application of known technology,28 inherently 
favored inventions made by creative as opposed to laborious 
processes. This is because creative inventions that span disciplines are 
less likely to be construed as obvious—that is, easily understood29—
precisely because no one has conceived of them previously. An 
ingenuity requirement that focuses on the inventor’s efforts, 
however, plainly favors inventions forged in the “burning of the 
midnight oil” over creative inventions coined solely in the mind. 
Regardless of which interpretation is right, it is apparent that the 
Venetian Act’s ingenuity requirement, the world’s first attempt at 
defining nonobviousness, at least established a conflict over whether 
patent law should favor one method of invention over another. 
It is difficult to trace the immediate development of 
nonobviousness from Venice because, although the Venetian Act was 
imported elsewhere into Europe, the ingenuity requirement largely 
disappeared. In England, for example, one early patent application 
cited the Venetian Act and alternatively referenced the invention’s 
“ingenious” advancement of ideas and “expense in experiments.”30 
Because the Crown did not issue written decisions regarding the 
reasons for granting patents, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine how it viewed the competing models of invention. After 
the Statute of Monopolies of 1623 codified the practice of obtaining 
a letters patent,31 its silence regarding ingenuity or obviousness made 
it unnecessary for future patent applications to discuss the matter. 
 
 28. See Mandich, supra note 22, at 183–84.   
 29. See Obvious Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/ 
browse/obvious (last visited Sept. 27, 2011). 
 30. Duffy, supra note 4, at 23–24. 
 31. Letters patents were the first industrial monopolies, generally granted to foreigners 
possessing a particular manufacturing skill to import and improve that skill in the granting 
country. In England,  
a patentee was supposed to: (i) work the patent, i.e., bring a foreign industry into 
the realm, (ii) not be inconvenient to other subjects, i.e., not interfere with 
established industries, and (iii) train apprentices, i.e., create a self-sufficient industry 
within the realm through which English subjects can make a living.  
Mossoff, supra note 27, at 1261. 
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Similarly, early French patents drew on the principles of the 
Venetian Act.32 Nonetheless, the concept of inventive merit was 
wholly absent in contemporaneous French patent grants, and patents 
could be granted to inventions upon a simple showing of novelty 
and utility.33 Further complicating the matter, the examination 
process shrouded patent applications in secrecy,34 shedding no light 
on whether the French Crown had a preference for creative, 
interdisciplinary inventions over laborious, empirically determined 
ones, or even whether it recognized such a distinction. Any insight 
the French system may have shone on its early Venetian counterpart 
was, therefore, also lost. The requirement that inventions be 
“ingenious,” in the Venetian Act’s phrasing, would not reemerge 
until the 1790s, after revolutions—legal and otherwise—took place 
in the United States and France. 
B. The Rise of Method-of-Invention Bias in U.S. Patent Law 
Shortly after the French Revolution in 1789, the newfound 
Republic was the first to attempt to codify an ingenuity requirement 
into a patent statute since the Venetian Republic did so over three 
hundred years earlier. In the French Patent Law of May 25, 1791, 
France forbade inventions that were mere “changemens de formes ou 
de proportions” (changes to an old invention’s forms or 
proportions).35 After fitful starts to the American patent statute, 
enacted two years earlier, this language was copied directly into the 
American 1793 Patent Act.36 Interestingly, where the “form or 
proportions” language lay dormant in French jurisprudence, it took 
hold in the United States.37  
 
 32. F. D. Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 106, 107–08 (1952) (“[The Venetian system] was then adopted in Germany, 
France, the Netherlands and England in practically the same form, during practically the same, 
short period between 1500 and 1550.”). 
 33. Duffy, supra note 4, at 36–37. 
 34. Frank D. Prager, Proposals for the Patent Act of 1790, 36 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 157 
(1954). 
 35. Loi du 25 mai 1791 décret portant règlement sur la propriété des auteurs 
d’inventions et découvertes en toute genre [Law of May 25, 1791 decree on regulations on 
the ownership of the authors of inventions and discoveries], COLLECTION GÉNÉRALE DES 
DÉCRETS RENDUS PAR L’ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE [GENERAL COLLECTION OF DECREES BY 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], May 1791, p. 169. 
 36. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836); see also Duffy, 
supra note 4, at 36–37 (discussing the interplay between the French and American statues). 
 37. Duffy, supra note 4, at 37. 
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U.S. courts, however, did not read the “form or proportion” 
language literally and rejected some inventions that were clearly 
beyond a change in mere “form or proportion.” In Evans v. Eaton, 
the inventor of an improved hopper boy, a device that raked and 
cooled freshly milled flour, sued for infringement.38 After a trial that 
found the patent invalid, the Supreme Court similarly expressed 
skepticism that such an invention came within the ambit of the 
patent statute. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall 
acknowledged that the invention was an improvement over several 
aspects of the art—“an improved elevator, an improved conveyor, an 
improved hopperboy, an improved drill, and an improved 
kilndryer”39—but nonetheless queried whether such advancements, 
even in combination, were “a mere change in the form or 
proportions”40 of other hopper boys. The Court concluded that the 
“form or proportion” language under the statute required “an 
improvement in the principles of a machine, art, or manufacture . . . 
if only in the form or proportion, it has not the merit of a discovery 
which can entitle the party to a patent.”41 
The Evans Court’s focus on the “principle” of the invention 
took hold in American jurisprudence. Chief Justice Marshall, sitting 
as a District Judge in Virginia, again expounded on this idea five 
years later in Davis v. Palmer.42 The case centered on a mouldbourd 
to a plow, a wedge that assists the plow in turning over the plowed 
field. The patentee had claimed an improved mouldboard that better 
assisted its user to plow a field circularly as opposed to linearly.43 
Thus, the improvement changed the widely used mouldboard plow 
little aside from the angle and shape of the mouldboard itself. The 
Chief Justice instructed the jury:  
It is not every change of form and proportion which is declared to 
be no discovery, but that which is simply a change of form or 
proportion, and nothing more. If, by changing the form and 
 
 38. Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. 454 (1818); see also Theodore R. Hazen, THE HOPPER-
BOY OF OLIVER EVANS, http://www.angelfire.com/journal/millrestoration/hopper.html (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2011). 
 39. Evans, 16 U.S. at 517. 
 40. Id. at 475. 
 41. Id. at 476. 
 42. Duffy, supra note 4, at 37 (citing Davis v. Palmer, 7 F. Cas. 154 (C.C.D. Va. 1827) 
(No. 3645)). 
 43. Davis, 7 F. Cas. at 159. 
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proportion, a new effect is produced, there is not simply a change 
of form and proportion, but a change of principle also.44 
This de facto third requirement for patentability—“a change of 
principle”—became so entrenched, that even after Congress left it 
out of the Patent Act of 1836, it nonetheless survived. In 1842, the 
Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict that found the defendant non-
infringing because of differences in “principles” of the two contested 
inventions, despite the fact that the two were quite similar methods 
of “forming the ribs of saw-gins.”45 In 1846, the Circuit Court of 
Massachusetts continued to require inventions to be not only “new 
in form [but] new in principle.”46 And in Wilson v. Simpson, in 1850, 
the Supreme Court heard arguments as to whether the patentee 
committed fraud by licensing his invention because the invention 
was “identical with the principle of [another’s earlier] machine.”47 
This non-statutory regime of “the principle of the invention,” 
however, would only survive for fourteen years. 
In 1850, the Supreme Court decided Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.48 
At the time, the newly founded United States Patent and Trademark 
Office received approximately 2,000 patent applications a year—
triple the number it received when it opened its doors only ten years 
earlier.49 Even in 1850, the nascent examination system had come 
under fire for allowing too many patents for “ordinary 
improvements” to inventions rather than real advances.50 The 
Hotchkiss patent claimed a doorknob, identical in other respects to 
earlier doorknobs, but the handle consisted of clay rather than wood 
or metal.51 This, the patentee argued, was its patentable 
improvement.52 The Supreme Court was rightfully unimpressed, and 
upheld the lower court’s finding of invalidity.53 But the Court went 
further, extending its holding beyond the “new principle” language 
 
 44. Duffy, supra note 4, at 37 (citing Davis, 7 F. Cas. at 154). 
 45. Carver v. Hyde, 41 U.S. 513, 513 (1842). 
 46. Hovey v. Stevens, 12 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 6745). 
 47. 50 U.S. 109, 121 (1850). 
 48. 52 U.S. 248 (1850).  
 49. U.S. Patent Activity, Calendar Years 1790 to Present, USPTO.GOV, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 
2010). 
 50. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 252. 
 51. Id. at 252. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 272. 
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that had been in place, with or without statutory authority, for at 
least three decades.54 Rather, the Court focused on the “ingenuity,” 
or lack thereof, of the invention. Concluding that, as compared to 
prior work, “[t]he difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or 
invention,”55 the majority finished its opinion: 
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of 
fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application 
of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an 
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an 
absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute 
essential elements of every invention. In other words, the 
improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the 
inventor.56 
As tempered as the Court’s words may have been, its effect was 
anything but. The amorphous concept of “ingenuity,” as a third 
patent requirement, would survive almost a century, with no help 
from Congress, until the Supreme Court took up the issue again in 
1941.57 In the meantime, “ingenuity” floundered in the courts with 
little consistency in its application and much ire from jurists.58 
 
 54. See supra notes 37–49 and accompanying text. 
 55. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 266. 
 56. Id. at 267.  
 57. See infra notes 69–102 and accompanying text. 
 58. C & A Potts & Co. v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597, 606 (1895) (“The answer to this 
requires the consideration of the often-recurring question, which has taxed the ingenuity of 
courts ever since the passage of the patent acts, as to what invention really is.”); McClain v. 
Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 426–27 (1891) (“To say that the act of invention is the production 
of something new and useful does not solve the difficulty of giving an accurate definition, since 
the question of what is new, as distinguished from that which is a colorable variation of what is 
old, is usually the very question in issue. To say that it involves an operation of the intellect, is 
a product of intuition, or of something akin to genius, as distinguished from mere mechanical 
skill, draws one somewhat nearer to an appreciation of the true distinction, but it does not 
adequately express the idea. The truth is, the word cannot be defined in such manner as to 
afford any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device involves an exercise of the 
inventive faculty or not.”); Aro Equip. Corp. v. Herring-Wissler Co., 84 F.2d 619, 622 (8th 
Cir. 1936) (“There is no strict formula to determine what constitutes invention”); A.O. Smith 
Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 1934) (“That which 
constitutes invention has, of course, never been successfully defined.”); Kirsch Mfg. Co. v. 
Gould Mersereau Co., 6 F.2d 793, 794 (2d Cir. 1925) (“Objective tests may be of value 
vaguely to give us a sense of direction, but the final destination can be only loosely indicated. 
An invention is a new display of ingenuity beyond the compass of the routineer, and in the end 
that is all that can be said about it. Courts cannot avoid the duty of divining as best they can 
what the day to day capacity of the ordinary artisan will produce.”); see also Duffy, supra note 
4, at 41. 
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Professor Duffy recounted the inconsistency with which courts 
applied the ingenuity test, “in a manner seemingly more lax than 
modern law” would allow.59 Justice Woodbury was prescient in his 
dissent in Hotchkiss, asserting that “the test adopted . . . has not the 
countenance of precedent, either English or American; and, at the 
same time, it seems open to great looseness or uncertainty in 
practice.”60  
Yet, the limited usefulness of the invention standard announced 
in Hotchkiss provides great insight into the movement of the federal 
courts from a relatively neutral position on the method of invention 
to a clear preference of favoring inventions created in more creative 
and abstract ways—a move from the province of the workbench to 
the realm of the mind. The pre-Hotchkiss invention standard, a 
change in the “principle” of the invention, did not materially favor 
one method of invention over another. Changes in the “principle” of 
a machine could come through either a bout of ingenuity or diligent 
plodding at the workbench. Whether differences in the method of, 
for example, forming the ribs of saw-gins constituted a change in the 
principle of their manufacture61 was a question that made irrelevant 
whether differences in the method were either conceived on paper or 
tested and tried in the workshop.  
Courts recognized from the outset that, apart from genius, 
bench experimentation that created new and useful things was 
valuable to the patent system, and that improvements over old 
inventions, assumedly “discovered” by experimentation, may 
produce a “new effect [that is] not simply a change of form and 
proportion, but a change of principle also.”62 This is not to say that 
the principle-of-the-invention standard made it easy to patent 
workbench inventions; the Supreme Court’s skepticism of Oliver 
Evans’s hopper-boy despite “an improved elevator, an improved 
conveyor, an improved hopper-boy, an improved drill, and an 
improved kiln-dryer” attests to that.63 But the principle-of-the-
invention standard was at least neutral as to whether Mr. Evans’s 
created each of the listed improvements of his hopper-boy by 
 
 59. Duffy, supra note 4, at 41. 
 60. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 270. 
 61. See Carver v. Hyde, 41 U.S. 513, 513 (1842). 
 62. Duffy, supra note 4, at 37 (citing Davis v. Palmer, 7 F. Cas. 154, 159 (C.C.D. Va. 
1827) (No. 3645)). 
 63. See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. 454, 462 (1818). 
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experimentation, or whether he “ingeniously” conceived of a way to 
combine them. 
The Hotchkiss standard, in contrast, was not so neutral. It, for the 
first time in American patent jurisprudence, required a measure of 
invention above that of an “ordinary mechanic.”64 Further, its focus 
on “ingenuity,” irrespective of whether the courts were able to 
satisfactorily define it,65 suggested a patentability standard that 
favored creative, synthetic inventions over workbench 
experimentation, regardless of how well-improved the actual 
resulting invention might have been.66 The Evans case serves as a 
useful point of comparison: whereas before Hotchkiss, the Evans 
hopper-boy may have been patentable, after Hotchkiss it was likely 
that it would summarily not be patentable.67 Serial improvements to 
components of a greater machine, as was Evans’s device, would 
surely be construed as no more “genius” than improvements made 
by an ordinary, albeit talented, mechanic. Other scholars have also 
recognized Hotchkiss’s shift away from a method-of-invention neutral 
standard.68 This trend would come to its pinnacle almost a century 
after Hotchkiss. 
C. Cuno Engineering and the Nonobviousness Statute 
In 1927, Herbert Mead of Detroit, Michigan applied for a 
patent entitled “Cigar Lighter.”69 The title did not do the invention 
justice; Mead invented the automatic cigar and cigarette lighter for 
automobiles substantially still in use today.70 Prior cigarette lighters 
were not automatic.71 They needed to be continually depressed by 
the user until they heated up.72 This had a number of problems: it 
distracted the operator’s attention away from the road, the heating 
element would often become too hot for use as a result of over-
 
 64. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267.  
 65. See supra cases cited at note 58. 
 66. See Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267. 
 67. Compare Evans, 16 U.S. at 462, with Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267. 
 68. Duffy, supra note 4, at 40 (“Hotchkiss could have meant that if a person having 
ordinary ingenuity and skill could eventually produce the innovation (perhaps after months or 
years of persistent effort), then the innovation would not be patentable.”).  
 69. U.S. Patent No. 1,736,544 (filed Nov. 19, 1929).  
 70. See Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 85–86 (1941). 
 71. Id. at 87. 
 72. Id. 
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pressing, and repeated overheating of the lighter would cause the 
heating element to burn out faster.73 Mead’s invention solved all of 
these problems in one fell swoop: a single press of the lighter would 
hold it in place; a thermostat in the lighter would recognize when 
the lighter reached the appropriate temperature and, when it did, 
would properly eject it.74 Further, the ejection of the lighter would 
make a clicking sound to alert the operator to its readiness, thus 
allowing the operator to direct his attention to the road and not the 
lighter while the lighter was heating up.75 
Mead’s invention showed both “ingenuity” and technical skill. 
The prior art was replete with problems: the base sockets were often 
“large and cumbersome,” there was no way to keep the lighter in the 
base socket without it heating, and none had a thermostatic 
control.76 One merit to Mead’s invention was that he conceived of 
the ability to solve all of these problems in a single device. At the 
same time, Mead’s invention displayed an impressive degree of 
technical skill: he was able to shrink the base socket to a size small 
enough to fit on a car dashboard and successfully implant the 
thermostat in the lighter and connect this to a spring that would 
automatically decouple the lighter from the base socket once it 
achieved the desired temperature.77 
In 1940, Mead’s invention became the subject of patent 
litigation in New York and Illinois.78 After a trial, both district courts 
found the patent valid and not infringed. The Second Circuit 
reversed, and found them valid and infringed.79 The Seventh Circuit, 
meanwhile, found the patent invalid.80 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the conflict.81 
In a short opinion, the Court delved into the prior art 
concerning automatic thermostats.82 It concluded that Mead’s 
 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. See id. at 93 (Stone, C.J., concurring).  
 77. See id.  
 78. See Automatic Devices Corp. v. Cuno Eng’g, 34 F. Supp. 146 (D. Conn. 1940). 
 79. Automatic Devices Corp. v. Cuno Eng’g, 117 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1941). 
 80. Automatic Devices Corp. v. Sinko Tool Mfg. Co., 112 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1940). 
 81. Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 85 (1941).  
 82. It noted the presence of automatically controlled thermostats in an electric heater 
(U.S. Patent No. 852,326), a flat iron (U.S. Patent No. 1,025,852), a coffee cooker (U.S. 
Patent No. 1,318, 168), a bread toaster (U.S. Patent No. 1,372,207), and a cigar lighter (U.S. 
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combination of the automatic thermostat into the portable cigar 
lighter was “new and useful.”83 But it nonetheless decided that 
Mead’s invention “does not rise to the dignity of a patentable 
device.”84 Relying on Hotchkiss, the Court declared that inventions 
could not be patentable if they were merely an “adaptation or 
combination of old or well-known devices for new uses.”85 The 
Court concluded that to be patentable, an invention “must reveal 
the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling.”86 
Therefore, it concluded that even though “[i]ngenuity was required 
to effect the adaptation, [it was] no more than that to be expected of 
a mechanic skilled in the art.”87  
Despite the Court’s stated reliance on Hotchkiss, Cuno was in fact 
an extreme departure. Hotchkiss, however vague, required 
“ingenuity” and nothing more. Cuno required more than 
“ingenuity”—it required that that ingenuity “reveal the flash of 
creative genius.”88 Ordinary ingenuity was no longer good enough; 
extraordinary ingenuity was required. And however ingenious a 
device may be, that ingenuity could not have come about through a 
slow and organic process of creation: Cuno required it show a “flash” 
of that ingenuity.89 
Cuno caused more problems than it solved. Its language 
provided virtually no guidance to the lower courts; it merely cajoled 
them to strike down as invalid all but the most “ingenious” of 
inventions.90 Scholars, practitioners, and jurists roundly condemned 
 
Patent No. 1,844,206). Id. at 88–89. 
 83. Cuno, 314 U.S. at 90. 
 84. Id. at 90 n.4.  
 85. Id. at 91.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 91–92. 
 88. See id. at 91. 
 89. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 42 (“Many technical advances are made by rather 
ordinary engineers who have nothing more than the ‘skill of the calling’—with the calling 
being the engineering of improvements on existing technologies. These engineers may not 
have many flashes of ‘genius;’ they are not in contention for Nobel Prizes. But their hard work 
does push forward the useful arts. If, ex ante, the engineers are confronting difficult problems 
with uncertain prospects of finding a solution, then the solution—if and when it is found—
should be patentable, without regard to whether the solution was found by genius or by 
tenacious plodding.”); see also Andrew B. Dzeguze, The Devil in the Details: A Critique of 
KSR’s Unwarranted Reinterpretation of “Person Having Ordinary Skill,” 10 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2009). 
 90. See Dzeguze, supra note 89, at 24–25.  
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Cuno as formlessly antagonistic to patents.91 Justice Robert H. 
Jackson later strongly rebuked his brethren for its jurisprudence.92 
Judge Learned Hand, post-Cuno, called patent validity “as fugitive, 
impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole 
paraphernalia of legal concepts.”93 Federal Circuit Chief Judge Giles 
Rich later described the judicial reaction as “furor.”94 
The near universal rebuke of Cuno, however, paved the way for 
reform.95 In 1941, shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President 
Roosevelt established the National Patent Planning Commission.96 
Although the express purpose of the Commission was to investigate 
the use and license of government-owned patents, presumably to 
further the war effort,97 the body eventually served as a vehicle to 
address the “flash of genius” standard established in Cuno.98 From 
the Commission, Chief Patent Examiner Pasquale (“Pat”) J. 
Federico and then-New York Patent Law Association President Giles 
S. Rich were tasked with an overhaul of the patent statute.99 While 
the two-person drafting committee made many recommendations 
for the new patent act, their most notable addition was § 103: the 
nonobviousness statute.100 In an effort to dispel the muddle 
surrounding what constituted an “invention”—and the means for 
making one—Federico and Rich focused on whether an invention 
 
 91. Id.; see also Laurence B. Dodds & Francis W. Crotty, The New Doctrinal Trend, 30 
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 83, 83 (1948) (“This fallacious impression is based on a preconceived 
notion that the truly great inventions of history have ‘burst full-blown from Athene’s brow’ 
during some incandescent flash of the inventor’s genius and that all true inventions are born by 
a similar parthenogenetic process. As a matter of fact, the record establishes that the majority 
of the great and classic inventions which have been tested in the Courts were hemmed about 
by the near inventions of many others and that, in each case, they represented that small 
advance which converted failure into commercial success.”). 
 92. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (complaining of a lack of “adequate tests of invention by the Patent Office” but 
chastising the Court for its “strong passion . . . for striking [patents] down so that the only 
patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on”). 
 93. Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).  
 94. See Rich, supra note 12, at 209. 
 95. Dzeguze, supra note 89, at 25; see also Rich, supra note 12, at 187. 
 96. Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Reinventing Public R&D: Patent Policy and the 
Commercialization of National Laboratory Technologies, 32 RAND J. ECON. 167, 170 (2001). 
 97. Id.  
 98. See Dzeguze, supra note 89, at 25.  
 99. See generally Rich, supra note 12. 
 100. Id.  
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was “nonobvious” at the time it was made.101 The language drafted 
by Judge Rich and Pat Federico remains today in § 103: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this 
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was 
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the 
manner in which the invention was made.102 
The second sentence is of particular note. In an effort to proscribe 
the “flash of genius” standard in Cuno—indeed, to completely do 
away with any concern over the manner in which a patentable 
invention was made—the drafters explicitly stated in the Revision 
Notes: “[I]t [is] immaterial whether [the invention] resulted from 
long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius.”103 The 
recommendations were embodied in the Patent Act of 1952 and 
summarily passed both houses without debate.104 
For many scholars, the nonobviousness statute struck the 
appropriate chord in requiring something more in a patentable 
invention than novelty and utility alone, without relying on 
subjective, amorphous standards like “invention,” “creativity,” and 
“ingenuity.”105 On his own work, Judge Rich remarked, “Since 1952 
there has been no void, but a carefully worked out statutory 
substitute for the rough-hewn stopgap the courts produced which 
the courts themselves said they could not explain.”106 
 
 101. Id.  
 102. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 2006).  
 103. See id. (Revision Notes); see also Duffy, supra note 4, at 43. 
 104. See Neil A. Smith, Remembrances and Memorial: Judge Giles Sutherland Rich 1904-
1999, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 597, 601 (2000) (quoting Giles S. Rich, Speech 
to the New Jersey Patent Law Association, Jefferson Medal Dinner (May 18, 1955) (“The 
New Patent Act went through both houses on consent calendars, and those houses relied on 
the unanimous recommendations of their respective committees, and when Truman signed the 
bill, we got the new law.”)). 
 105. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 43 (“[Nonobviousness] is not a ridiculously low standard 
of patentability; the standard still requires a fairly substantial contribution. But it was designed 
to end the Court’s search for a distinction between ordinary and extraordinary ingenuity and 
to focus the inquiry solely on obviousness.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in 
Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 80–81 (2008). 
 106. Rich, supra note 12, at 207. 
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But many scholars take for granted that the method-of-invention 
requirement has, in fact, been eliminated.107 From a distant view, this 
is not absurd: if Cuno represented the zenith of the method-of-
invention requirement, then § 103’s statutory prohibition against 
such analysis should have been its nadir. Yet, a closer examination of 
the operation of nonobviousness analysis since 1952 reveals that this 
is not so. Buried in § 103 itself, the section’s focus on “the art to 
which said subject matter pertains,” lives a method-of-invention bias. 
As technology has progressed, a broadening scope of “the art” in § 
103 favors inventions created by “creativity,” “ingenuity,” and 
“flashes of genius” over those made by diligent experimentation. 
“Creative” or “ingenious” inventions, after all, are more likely to 
draw upon disparate arts than those “hemmed about by the near 
inventions of many others . . . represent[ing a] small advance which 
converted failure into commercial success.”108 Despite § 103’s 
attempt to overturn over a century of history, the method-of-
invention requirement has, in fact, lived on. 
III. ANALOGOUS VS. NONANALOGOUS ARTS 
A. “The Art to Which Said Subject Matter Pertains” 
Nonobviousness is relative: nonobvious for whom, and as 
compared to what? In many instances, the inventive solution to a 
problem may not be obvious to some but quite obvious to others.109 
This may be due to a number of reasons, such as difficulty 
conceiving of the invention, trouble reducing the invention to 
practice, and technological limitations impeding both.110 The patent 
statute seeks to confine this universe of inquiry by narrowing its 
focus to “the art to which said subject matter pertains.”111 The line-
 
 107. E.g., Duffy, supra note 4, at 43 (“The statute also stated that ‘[p]atentability shall 
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.’ Though perhaps awkwardly 
phrased, this further provision was intended to clarify that the particular inventor’s method and 
talents would be irrelevant to the inquiry. Thus, the inventor seized with a ‘flash of genius’ 
would not be favored over an engineer with ordinary skill and ingenuity who worked diligently 
and ploddingly toward a useful advance.”). 
 108. Dodds & Crotty, supra note 91, at 83.  
 109. See id. 
 110. See Fromer, supra note 105, at 88–89 (discussing the differences among obviousness 
in reduction to practice, conception, and technical feasibility).  
 111. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). The statute also attempts to limit the nonobviousness 
inquiry characteristically, to “a person having ordinary skill in the art,” and temporally, to “the 
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drawing exercise the statute creates for the courts, therefore, is 
whether the art in question “pertains,” or is pertinent to, the subject 
matter of the invention.112 
In drafting § 103, it is doubtful that Pat Federico and Judge 
Rich intentionally imbued the nonobviousness statute with some 
particular meaning by choosing the word “pertains” as the vehicle 
for comparison of prior art to the particular invention.113 
Nonetheless, the word’s expansive definition114 should give a careful 
judge pause. To guide the pertinence question, courts have since 
relied on the older common law distinction between “analogous” 
and “nonanalogous arts.”115 
Analogous arts can be grouped into two categories: The first, 
those arts “from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the 
problem addressed.”116 As an example, hair brushes and 
toothbrushes can properly be deemed analogous “brush arts,” even 
though a hair brush is used to straighten and give volume to its 
object, hair, while a toothbrush is used to clean its object, teeth.117 
The second category includes those arts that exist in a different field 
of endeavor from the invention but solve the same problem or have 
 
time the invention was made,” but discussions of these limitations are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 112. This is necessary because, unlike the novelty inquiry, which requires that all elements 
of the invention be present in a single prior art reference, the nonobvious inquiry allows 
elements from separate prior art references to be combined. Without this requirement, every 
antedated reference, regardless of its relevance to the invention, becomes a potentially patent-
defeating piece of prior art. 
 113. See generally Rich, supra note 12 (lamenting the problems that arise from giving too 
much meaning to particular words in the patent statute). 
 114. Pertains Definition, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 1312 (4th ed. 2009) (“To have reference; relate . . . . To belong as an adjunct, 
part, holding, or quality . . . . To be fitting or suitable.”). 
 115. See, e.g., In re Flick, 210 F.2d 832, 835 (C.C.P.A. 1954) (“It is well settled that the 
pertinence of a reference depends on whether it would suggest to one skilled in the art to do 
what appellants have done. This is also true when considering a reference alleged not to be in 
the analogous art.”). 
  The first reference to “analogous arts” prior to the nonobviousness statute appeared 
in In re McLaughlin, 36 F.2d 438, 440 (C.C.P.A. 1929), for a method of making ready-to-eat 
chocolate cakes. There, the examiner found a similar method using corn meal, and the 
inventor protested, claiming that baking with corn meal and powdered chocolate were not 
“analogous arts.” Other cases through the 1930s and beyond discuss this distinction. See, e.g., 
In re Beaumont, 58 F.2d 458, 459 (C.C.P.A. 1932); In re Fischer, 62 F.2d 97, 98 (C.C.P.A. 
1932); In re Raleigh, 62 F.2d 200, 202 (C.C.P.A. 1932). 
 116. In re Johenning, No. 93-1217, 1994 WL 374505, at *2 (Fed. Cir. July 15, 1994). 
 117. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
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the same purpose as the invention sought to be patented.118 Cone-
shaped caps for oil decanters can therefore be construed as analogous 
art with respect to cone-shaped caps for bags of popcorn, even 
though the “oil can” art is not in the same field of endeavor as the 
“popcorn bag” art.119 
Inversely, nonanalogous arts are those from a different field of 
endeavor from the invention.120 These can be disparate arts, say, 
rocket science and dairy science, or from related arts to which an 
inventor should not be reasonably expected to look for prior art.121 
In In re Oetiker, for example, the Federal Circuit reversed a Patent 
Office finding of obviousness when the examiner found that the 
applicant’s metal clamp for a garment hose was too similar to other 
plastic clamps used in clothing. The appellate court concluded that 
although both inventions were clamps, an inventor interested in 
perfecting the clamping of garden hoses could not be reasonably 
expected to scour the art of pantyhose.122 
This distinction between the analogous and nonanalogous arts 
has served as a short-hand for pertinent art under § 103. That is, 
analogous art is art to which the subject matter of the invention 
pertains and can therefore be used in obviousness determinations. 
Nonanalogous art, meanwhile, is not pertinent and cannot be used 
in obviousness determinations under the statute.123 Questions of 
nonobviousness, and therefore validity, often rest on whether the 
examiner or the court construes a particular prior art reference as 
analogous or nonanalogous art. 
B. The Subjective Nature of the Analogous Art Test 
As mentioned, the characterization of prior art as analogous or 
nonanalogous is principally an exercise in line-drawing. In Bigio, the 
hair brush versus toothbrush case, the majority’s opinion raises the 
question: Why were the arts in question characterized as 
 
 118. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  
 119. See In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Although the Federal Circuit 
eventually affirmed the PTO’s rejection of the invention on novelty rather than obviousness 
grounds, the case contains a substantive discussion of whether the oil decanter occupied the 
same “field of endeavor” as the invention. 
 120. See In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 659.  
 121. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 122. Id. at 1446–47.  
 123. See In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 659.  
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“analogous” to begin with? Could not the court have equally 
construed the respective arts as the “dental art” and the “hair art”? 
Why not the “straightening arts” and the “cleaning arts”? The same 
query applies to Schreiber (popcorn shakers vs. oil cans)124 and 
Oetiker (hose clamps vs. garment clamps).125 Taking the “object 
approach” from Bigio—that is, assessing analogous arts based on the 
“object” of the invention, such as “a brush”—why was it proper for 
the court to analogize popcorn shakers and oil cans as “dispensers,” 
but improper for the court to analogize hose clamps and garment 
clamps as “clamps”? 
There has yet to be any case in Federal Circuit jurisprudence that 
makes clear the answers to these questions. Nor is there anything 
inherent about the technologies at issue in Bigio, Schreiber, or 
Oetiker that would naturally lead one to the same conclusion as the 
Federal Circuit. It is doubtful that there exists in the arts of brushes 
and dispensers some element that predisposes them to analogy across 
applications, which the art of clamps happens to lack. How, then, to 
conceive of Schreiber, Oetiker, Bigio, and others, as part of a 
consistent whole? 
Perhaps they can’t be. In Bigio, the applicant complained that 
the analogous art test “is unworkable because the lack of clear 
guidelines leaves the application of this test to a [patent] examiner’s 
subjective judgment.”126 The Bigio majority dismissed these concerns 
by responding that the analogous art inquiry is “neither wholly 
subjective nor unworkable. [The] test for analogous art requires the 
PTO to determine the appropriate field of endeavor by reference to 
explanations of the invention’s subject matter in the patent 
application, including the embodiments, function, and structure of 
the claimed invention.”127 Yet this very characterization of the 
analogous art test belied the subjective, and at times, arbitrary nature 
of the inquiry. How does one define “subject matter”? And in 
referencing the applicant’s explanations, what is it, exactly, that the 
examiner should be looking for? The majority’s opinion does not 
answer these basic concerns. 
Nor has the Federal Circuit been consistent on the proper 
approach to determining which art is analogous on the face of a 
 
 124. 128 F.3d at 1473. 
 125. 977 F.2d at 1443. 
 126. 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 127. Id.  
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patent application. Perhaps too charitably, one Washington patent 
attorney has conceded that, historically, “the case law appears erratic 
on this issue.”128 More vehemently, another has written that “the 
courts have tended to define what comprises analogous art in a very 
broad manner,” chastising the doctrine as “subjective”—a damning 
modifier in patent law analysis.129 Another has aptly summarized the 
schizophrenia of analogous art inquiries: 
Some were made on the basis of whether references were 
reasonably pertinent to the inventor’s problem. Others discussed 
similarity of elements, problems and purposes, or similarities and 
differences in structure and function. Still others reached their 
result on the basis of what was deemed the “invention as a 
whole.”130 
In a telling example, one recent case struggled with three 
different conceptions of analogous art. In Mykrolis Corp. v. Pall 
Corp., the Massachusetts District Court considered the validity of a 
patent for semiconductor coating fluid.131 The court struggled with 
how best to draw the analogous art. It considered “filtration devices 
or fluid separation devices”; “fluid separation devices having an easily 
replaceable and disposable fluid separation module”; and “such 
devices as are used in industrial processes or the manufacturing 
environment, as opposed to medical applications.”132 Finding none 
of these particularly satisfactory, the court simply concluded that the 
asserted “references appear to at least be reasonably pertinent to the 
problem the [plaintiff’s] inventions sought to solve.”133 In other 
words, even though the district court could not discern the contours 
of the analogous art, it nonetheless concluded that the prior art 
references asserted by the examiner seemed “reasonably pertinent to 
the problem” faced by the inventor, thus bypassing the entire 
analogous art inquiry. 
This struggle to define “the analogous art” lends credence to the 
notion that the analogous arts test is wholly subjective, contrary to 
 
 128. Jeffrey T. Burgess, The Analogous Art Test, 7 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 63, 70 
(2009). 
 129. See Hilary K. Dobies, New Viability in the Doctrine of Analogous Art, 34 IDEA 227, 
229 (1994). 
 130. Id. at 229–30 (citations omitted). 
 131. No. Civ.A.03-10392-GAO, 2005 WL 81920, at *5 (D. Mass. Jan. 12, 2005).  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
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the Federal Circuit’s rebuke of the inventor’s criticisms in Bigio.134 
Systemically looking at the issue across district court opinions, even 
the most generous view of the test finds a schizophrenic approach to 
defining an analogous art.135 As in Mykrolis, other courts, including 
the Federal Circuit, have circumvented the analysis entirely.136 It is 
difficult to conclude that the analogous arts test, therefore, is 
anything other than a “subjective” inquiry, a matter of judicial 
discretion or juridical whim, inappropriate for the supposed 
“objective” intent of measuring obviousness against a person having 
ordinary skill in the art. 
This criticism of the analogous art test’s objectivity has not 
escaped the notice of dissenting circuit court judges. In In re Mlot-
Fijalkowsi, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s finding that an 
asserted reference was analogous. The dissent subtly pointed out that 
the majority did not undertake a thorough analysis of whether the 
two references were actually analogous, but that its finding was 
merely “premised on its conclusory statement that they are ‘from the 
pertinent related dye arts.’”137 In In re Metz, the dissent criticized the 
majority for finding that there existed the “hologram arts,” which 
had the effect of analogizing “[t]he use of holograms in window 
treatments to filter out infrared (heat) radiation . . . to the use of 
 
 134. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 135. See Dobies, supra note 129, at 229.  
 136. Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting In re 
Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (bypassing the issue of whether prior art references 
were in an analogous art and summarily concluding that “[e]ven if the prior art padlocks were 
not within the same field of endeavor, they are nonetheless clearly ‘reasonably pertinent’ to the 
problem that the inventor was trying to solve” with little discussion); Sentry Prot. Prods., Inc. 
v. Eagle Mfg. Co., No. 1:01CV2240, 2003 WL 25539702, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2003) 
(concluding that a prior patent was “reasonably pertinent” to the problem solved by the 
invention in dispute, without defining the field of endeavor of the invention); NB Jackets De 
P.R. v. Microseal Corp., No. 84C6544, 1986 WL 2056, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1986) 
(“Although we have not definitively specified the inventor's field of endeavor as either 
microfilm jackets or plastics bonding, the [asserted references] disclose inventions so similar in 
purpose and function to plaintiff's invention that their relevancy is not seriously in doubt.”); cf. 
Fraser v. Continental Realty Corp., 356 F. Supp. 704, 707 (S.D. W. Va. 1972), aff’d, 474 
F.2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1973) (concluding that analyzing a patent under the doctrine of 
equivalents “involves the intricacies of technical interpretations of the art at a given time . . . . 
This means that objectivity is difficult when the opinions of experts in a given field of endeavor 
are clothed in subjectivity. Cold, practical analysis on this issue in so many cases is next to 
impossible”). 
 137. In re Mlot-Fijalkowski, 676 F.2d 666, 671–72 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Miller, J., 
dissenting). 
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holograms in detecting biochemical fluorescence.”138 And finally in 
Bigio, Judge Newman chastised her colleagues, stating that she could 
not find “any ground on which a person seeking to design an 
improved hairbrush would deem the toothbrush art to be a source of 
usable technology, and thus ‘analogous.’”139 
While commentators have disagreed on the best means for 
utilizing the analogous art test, most, if not all, see the test as being 
as loosely applied as did the applicant in Bigio. Arguing for more 
flexibility to invalidate “obvious” internet patents, Professor Bagley 
has suggested using the analogous art doctrine.140 With 
Congressional action and PTO reform being more difficult to 
implement, Bagley lauds “[t]his uncertainty regarding application of 
the doctrine of analogous art [as it] may be fortuitous in the context 
of Internet business model patents because it demonstrates the 
elasticity of the doctrine.”141 Responding to Bagley, Professor 
Takenaka does not disagree that “a serious flaw inherent to the 
doctrine of analogous art is its arbitrary nature of defining the 
applicable scope.”142 Another commentator, while concluding that 
the analogous art test resides in “practicable boundaries,” still 
recognizes that under the doctrine “the subjective view of the 
examiner may affect the ultimate determination of patentability.”143 
One practicing patent attorney has found that “[a]n issue that is so 
apparently subjective can allow an advocate some wiggle room in 
which a powerfully persuasive argument can sway a fact finder even 
in a seemingly hopeless situation.”144 
The result of the “elastic,” “subjective,” or “broad” analogous 
arts test lies in its effect. The analogous arts inquiry allows courts to 
draw the analogous arts in a way that suits them, be it to limit a 
patent’s analogous art to its “field of endeavor,” or to conclude that 
 
 138. No. 97-1263, 1998 WL 670185, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 1998) (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 139. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1327 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 140. Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 270 (2001).  
 141. Id.  
 142. Toshiko Takenaka, International and Comparative Law Perspectives on Internet 
Patents, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 423, 428 (2001). 
 143. Jeff J. Maday, Note, In re Bigio: Brushing Your Hair with a Toothbrush? The 
Interplay Between the Broadest Reasonable Interpretation Rule and the Analogous Art Doctrine, 
7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 313, 323 (2005). 
 144. Burgess, supra note 128, at 70.  
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a prior art reference is “at least . . . reasonably pertinent to the 
problem the [plaintiff’s] inventions sought to solve.”145 Defining the 
field of a patent’s analogous art allows a court to choose the scope of 
the obviousness inquiry: the broader the analogous art, the greater 
number of prior art references that can potentially be held against 
the inventor, and the more likely that the patent will be found 
invalid as obvious. In this sense, the power to construe a reference as 
“analogous” or “non-analogous,” therefore, is nothing short of the 
power to invalidate patents or reject patent applications. 
This suggests that the standard of “inventiveness” has come full 
circle. Saddled with an unworkable standard of “creative ingenuity” 
in 1941 that gave the courts too much discretion to invalidate 
otherwise inventive patents,146 patent law moved to what it perceived 
to be a more objective, and less discretionary, standard of 
“nonobviousness” in 1952.147 But this very same “objective 
standard” ended up incorporating the older common law—and 
mainly subjective—analogous art test, which now similarly gives 
courts considerable, and perhaps too much, discretion to deny 
patents on the basis of obviousness. The patentability inquiry, 
therefore, has replaced one “fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and 
vague . . . phantom” with another.148 
C. The Trend Towards Analogizing 
As technology has progressed, so has the analogous arts test. 
While the elasticity of the test potentially lends itself to either 
expansion or contraction, the courts have uniformly broadened, as 
opposed to narrowed, what they perceive to be analogous arts. This 
stems, perhaps, from the courts’ recognition that technological 
advancement has become increasingly interdisciplinary. 
In 1895, the Supreme Court in C & A Potts & Co. v. Creager 
found a “peculiar intuitive genius” in “the idea that a device used in 
one art may be made available in another.”149 But by 1966, the 
 
 145. Mykrolis Corp. v. Pall Corp., No. Civ.A.03-10392-GAO, 2005 WL 81920, at *5 
(D. Mass. Jan. 12, 2005), aff’d in part, dismissed in part sub nom. Entegris, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 
490 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 146. See Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
 147. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 148. Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).  
 149. 155 U.S. 597, 607–08 (1895). 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011  1:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1116 
Court had dispensed with the notion that using technology from 
one field to solve problems in another was genius at all. That year, in 
Graham v. John Deere Co., Justice Clark delivered the famous lines: 
Technology, however, has advanced—and with remarkable rapidity 
in the last 50 years. Moreover, the ambit of applicable art in given 
fields of science has widened by disciplines unheard of a half 
century ago. It is but an evenhanded application to require that 
those persons granted the benefit of a patent monopoly be charged 
with an awareness of these changed conditions. The same is true of 
the less technical, but still useful arts. He who seeks to build a 
better mousetrap today has a long path to tread before reaching the 
Patent Office.150 
Justice Clark’s words have been an apt prophesy of the 
technological revolution that succeeded his opinion in Graham. 
Shortly after his opinion, the invention of the computer 
microprocessor collapsed a number of previously disparate 
technologies into a single field: computer science.151 The electronics 
and telecommunications fields, once separate disciplines, merged 
into a single computer-assisted field. The merger “erased the 
boundaries between data processing and data transmission and 
between data, voice, and video communications [and] blurred the 
lines between single-processor computers, multi-processor 
computers, local networks, metropolitan networks, and long-haul 
networks.”152 
Beginning in the 1990s, the rise of nanotechnology similarly saw 
the merger of the physical, chemical, and engineering sciences.153 In 
inventing machines that measured less than one one-hundred-
thousandth of a meter, the field sought to combine the techniques of 
“information technology, polymer research, optics, biochemistry and 
medicine and micromechanics.”154 Technologies previously thought 
to be wholly separate from one another, such as molecular biology 
 
 150. 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966). 
 151. See generally William Aspray, The Intel 4004 Microprocessor: What Constituted 
Invention?, 19 IEEE ANNALS OF THE HISTORY OF COMPUTING 4 (July 1997). 
 152. Lance Leonard Barry, Cézanne and Renoir: Analogous Art in Patent Law, 13 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 243, 246–47 (2005) (citations omitted).  
 153. M. Meyer & O. Persson, Nanotechnology-Interdisciplinarity, Patterns of 
Collaboration and Differences in Application, 42 SCIENTOMETRICS 195, 198 (1998).  
 154. JOACHIM SCHUMMER & DAVIS BARD, NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS AND SOCIETY 189 (2006). 
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and mechanical engineering, have been, in the nanotechnology 
context, conceived of as a single, unified art.155 
This trend has given the courts cause to broaden what they 
consider to be an “analogous art.” If interdisciplinary solutions to 
technological problems are the norm, then it would stand to reason 
that the insight to those solutions—that is, the prior art—also 
normally lies outside of the discipline at hand.156 In a famous patent 
case involving weather engineering,157 the Court of Claims opined 
that “[h]uman knowledge cannot be compartmentalized or 
pigeonholed, and the courts have recognized this in evaluating the 
relevancy of art that comes before them in a[n obviousness] 
context.”158 There, the court found that the inventor’s patent for 
“cloud seeding”—dispersing chemicals throughout the air in order 
to form clouds—was obvious in light of antecedent patents that 
disclosed a system for the “airborne delivery and fusing” of 
objects.159 The inventor vainly attempted to characterize the older 
patents as nonanalogous prior art, but the court concluded that 
given the interdisciplinary nature of modern invention, “it is 
unrealistic to assume or demand that the cloud seeder confine his 
reading to The Journal of Weather Modification.”160 
The seeming folly of the subject matter in Weather Engineering 
aside, this trend towards analogizing arts has driven courts, in 
applying the analogous arts test, to rope in widely disparate fields of 
invention to invalidate patents, even to levels of absurdity. In George 
J. Meyer Manufacturing Co. v. San Marino Electronic Corp., the 
court found a glass-bottle inspecting system, used to check for 
defects in glass bottles, analogous to a military missile tracking 
 
 155. M. Knoblauch & W.S. Peters, Biomimetic Actuators: Where Technology and Cell 
Biology Merge, 61 CELLULAR AND MOLECULAR LIFE SCI. 2497, 2506 (2004) (“It is 
fascinating to see how not only experimental approaches but also theoretical concepts merge in 
this no-man’s land between established disciplines.”). 
 156. See Barry, supra note 152, at 246 (“In today’s world, questions arising in a 
particular industry are answered not only by those inside the industry but by those trained in 
scientific fields having no ‘necessary relationship’ thereto.”) (quoting George J. Meyer Mfg. 
Co. v. San Marino Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1970)). 
 157. That is, the science of controlling the weather, which is often practiced by using 
such methods as firing rockets filled with inorganic solvents into clouds. For a popular article 
on the subject, see J.R. Fleming, The Climate Engineers, WILSON Q., Spring 2007, at 46.  
 158. Weather Eng’g Corp. of Am. v. United States, 614 F.2d 281, 287 (Ct. Cl. 1980). 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id.  
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system.161 The invention involved placing a glass bottle over a light 
source, which would then shine a light through the bottle’s glass and 
into a photoelectric cell.162 Depending on the refraction of the light, 
the photoelectric cell could determine if the bottle was defective, and 
if so, where the defect was located.163 The court analogized this to a 
missile targeting system that optically tracked missiles against the 
sky.164 The “analogous art,” according to the court, was “the 
detection of foreign objects in a field of view by electro-optical 
techniques.”165 Despite the court’s conclusion, it is difficult to 
envision Coke bottle engineers combing NASA literature to solve 
the problem of the flawless soda bottle. To paraphrase the court in 
Weather Engineering, it seems unrealistic to assume or demand that 
the bottle engineer should expand his reading to The Journal of 
Aerospace Engineering.166 
Recently, the Supreme Court’s opinion in KSR International Co. 
v. Teleflex Inc. has furthered this trend.167 In KSR, the patentee had 
claimed an adjustable gas pedal connected to a modular sensor that 
could be used in computer controlled automotive systems.168 While 
the prior art included both adjustable gas pedals and modular 
sensors, no one had previously been able to combine the two 
technologies.169 Concluding that combining these two technologies 
would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the 
mechanical and electrical engineering arts, the Court deemphasized 
the Federal Circuit’s “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (“TSM”) 
test: that is, finding an inventive combination obvious if the prior art 
contained a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to create the 
combination.170 By chastising the Federal Circuit for relying almost 
 
 161. 422 F.2d at 1289–90. 
 162. Id. at 1286. 
 163. Id. at 1287. 
 164. Id. at 1287–88. 
 165. Id. at 1288. 
 166. See Weather Eng’g Corp. of Am. v. United States, 614 F.2d 281, 286–87 (Ct. Cl. 
1980). 
 167. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 168. Id. at 405–06.  
 169. Id. at 407–09. This was likely due to a problem inherent in the modular sensor 
throttle art. Modular sensors, at least at the time, measured the distance the pedal was pushed 
by the driver from a fixed point. An adjustable gas pedal, therefore, would be a variable 
distance from the fixed point depending on where it was positioned, much like a moving 
target. See id. at 408–09. 
 170. Id. at 418.  
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exclusively on this test, the Supreme Court, in effect, expanded the 
circumstances where combinations of prior art were obvious, 
rejecting “rigid and mandatory formulas” and “formalistic 
conceptions” of obviousness in favor of a “common sense” approach 
based on the “diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern 
technology.”171 
This “common sense” approach appears to be a one-way ratchet: 
because the Federal Circuit’s previous TSM test was, in the words of 
the Supreme Court, a “narrow conception” of obviousness—not 
simply an incorrect conception—the Court gave its blessing to 
widening the obviousness inquiry.172 Therefore, post-KSR, 
obviousness should not be limited to the TSM test, or any test, but 
should be expanded to include “common sense” and the thrust of 
new technology. In tune with this conception of KSR, the Court 
brought back from the dead a facet of the obvious inquiry that the 
Federal Circuit had buried long ago: the “obvious to try” 
standard.173 That is, despite the content of the prior art, if it would 
have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art to try 
combining certain elements to achieve a predictable result, that 
combination would be obvious under § 103.174 A number of 
commentators have also suggested that KSR has consequently 
broadened the analogous art inquiry.175 
Although Justice Clark’s statement that “the ambit of applicable 
art in given fields of science has widened by disciplines unheard of a 
half century ago,”176 the results of the analogous art test 
 
 171. Id. at 418–19.  
 172. See id. at 419 (emphasis added). 
 173. Id. at 421 (“[T]he fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it 
was obvious under § 103.”); see also In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(“‘Obvious to try’ has long been held not to constitute obviousness.” (quoting In re O’Farrell, 
853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988))). 
 174. KSR Int’l, Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). 
 175. E.g., Christopher A. Brown, Developments in Intellectual Property Law, 41 IND. L. 
REV. 1139, 1148 (2008) (“[T]he Court views patentable subject matter as inventions that are 
closer toward the ‘flash of genius’ end of the inventive spectrum.”); Dzeguze, supra note 89, 
at 40; Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
127, 135 (2008) (“Thus, the post-KSR PHOSITA is not a plodder but a creative 
individual.”); Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the Indeterminate 
Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 115–16 
(2008); Theresa Stadheim, How KSR v. Teleflex Will Affect Patent Prosecution in the Electrical 
and Mechanical Arts, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 142, 152 (2009) (“After KSR, the 
test for analogous art is much broader.”). 
 176. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966).  
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incorporating this rapid scientific interdisciplinarity seem far beyond 
those predicted or intended by Graham. It is one thing to charge an 
inventor seeking to “build a better mousetrap” with more prior art 
references than he would have been responsible for fifty years ago; it 
is another to analogize glass making with rocket science,177 or to 
declare that meticulously engineered inventions are not patentable 
because they would have been obvious to try.178 Given the subjective 
nature of the analogous art test, and the trend towards increasingly 
analogizing disparate arts, the test serves mainly as a proxy to 
invalidate “less mysterious inventions a judge can understand” but 
validate “complex inventions difficult for judges to understand.”179 
This byproduct of increased analogization has contained an inherent 
method-of-invention bias. 
D. Analogizing Prior Art and the Method of Invention 
The trend towards analogizing prior art has not treated all 
patents equally. Rather, the interdisciplinary application of the 
analogous art test has discriminated against patents based on their 
methods of invention. Specifically, the increasing trend to analogize 
prior art has favored patents made more creatively and abstractly, as 
in, perhaps, a “flash of genius,”180 over those made more 
experimentally and laboriously, i.e., through “long toil and 
experimentation.”181 This arises because certain scientific disciplines 
typically create inventions by more laborious and empirical processes, 
while other disciplines’ inventions germinate primarily from the 
mind alone. 
 
 177. Compare id. (“He who seeks to build a better mousetrap today has a long path to 
tread before reaching the Patent Office.”), with George J. Meyer Mfg. Co. v. San Marino Elec. 
Corp., 422 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1970) (“These considerations lead us to believe that 
today the word ‘art’ includes not only the knowledge accumulated with respect to a problem 
in a particular industry but that accumulated in those scientific fields the techniques of which 
have been commonly employed to solve problems of a similar kind in the particular and closely 
related fields. In the bottle inspection field the sciences of optics and electronics had been 
widely used and as new electronic and optical techniques were developed to solve, in related 
fields, problems of the kind presented by bottle inspection, then those techniques became part 
of the relevant art.”). 
 178. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.  
 179. See Irah H. Donner, Combating Obviousness Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, 6 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 159, 199 (1996); see also Twin Disc, Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 
713 (1986). 
 180. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2006) (1952 Revision Notes). 
 181. See id. 
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Inventions in chemistry, for example, are typically, if not always, 
the product of experimentation. In order to patent a particular 
chemical, an inventor must overcome two technical hurdles: 
synthesis or extraction and discerning the compound’s function. In 
the synthesis step, the inventor of a chemical must determine how to 
either extract the chemical from a product in nature, such as 
extracting a chemical from the bark of a particular tree, or how to 
design a method to synthesize it through other chemical processes.182 
In the function step, the inventor must determine the function of the 
chemical compound.183 Because all patents must have “utility” under 
35 U.S.C. § 102, an inventor cannot obtain a patent for a chemical 
compound without knowing how it can be used.184 While any 
empiricist worth his salt, so to speak, will likely have a general idea 
how his novel compound may work, this ultimately needs to be 
confirmed by experiment before obtaining a patent.185 Thus, 
although an invention “need not be actually reduced to practice” to 
obtain a patent,186 in the chemistry context at least, an inventor 
needs to come quite close to reduction.  
The Federal Circuit noted this effect in Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, 
Inc.187 There the plaintiff complained that it was only able to create 
the patented invention amlodipine besylate, a salt used to better 
deliver drugs orally, “through the use of trial and error 
procedures.”188 Because it was unclear whether the compound would 
work as the plaintiff intended, the plaintiff noted that the mere 
conception of the invention required “routine experimentation” and 
 
 182. See generally, JORDAN GOODMAN & VIVIEN WALSH, THE STORY OF TAXOL: 
NATURE AND POLITICS IN THE PURSUIT OF AN ANTI-CANCER DRUG (2001). The successful 
cancer drug, Taxol, was originally extracted from the bark of the Pacific yew tree. Because of 
the immaturity of the art of chemical synthesis at the time, Taxol could only be extracted from 
the tree’s bark and could not be inorganically synthesized. Although cellular assays of the drug 
proved promising, manufacturing was an immediate concern: it would take the bark of almost 
400,000 trees to deliver an annual supply to American patients. Recent research has developed 
an alternative to stripping yew tree bark, but Taxol still cannot be wholly synthesized 
inorganically.  
 183. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532–33 (1966) (discussing the utility 
requirement of chemical patents).  
 184. Id.  
 185. See id. at 522 (discussing the predictability of steroid homologues). 
 186. See Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The filing of a patent 
application serves as conception and constructive reduction to practice of the subject matter 
described in the application.”). 
 187. 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 188. Id. at 1366–67.  
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“routine testing.”189 In concluding that the plaintiff’s invention was 
obvious, the court noted that “the length, expense, and difficulty” of 
merely conceiving the invention “require[d] extensive time, money, 
and effort to carry out.”190 This is the peculiar nature of chemistry in 
the patent context: because neither the synthesis of a chemical 
compound, nor its function, can be hypothesized in the abstract, the 
invention of a particular compound often requires a good deal of 
“long toil and experimentation.”191 
The same is true in molecular biology. The functional unit of 
biological reactions, proteins, cannot be invented in the abstract. An 
inventor of a protein must, typically, either find the protein as it 
exists in nature and extract it, or invent the protein through a 
random synthesis and screening process.192 Still, the inventor must 
engage in two final steps before the protein can be patented. She 
must sequence the protein into its comprising string of amino acids, 
and then, as in chemistry, determine its function.193 Like chemical 
compounds, the sequence of a protein and its biological function 
cannot be hypothesized in the abstract.194 Experimental confirmation 
is required to determine what the protein is, i.e., its sequence, and 
how the protein functions, i.e., its use.195 Without this “routine 
experimentation” and “routine testing,” the inventor’s protein 
generally cannot be patented.196 
Other disciplines do not require such “extensive time, money, 
and effort” to produce an invention. A person having ordinary skill 
in the art of electrical engineering, for example, will generally be able 
 
 189. Id. at 1367 (citing In re Yates, 663 F.2d 1054, 1056 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532–33 (1966); Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1366–
67. 
 192. See generally, Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfus, Reflections on the Science 
and Law of Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REV. 871 
(2006) (discussing the patenting process of biological materials). 
 193. See id. at 874–79 (discussing these aspects of protein invention). 
 194. See id. at 879–83.  
 195. See id. at 891 (“[T]he value in finding sequences and structures is an intermediate 
value. It lies in learning about the gene or the protein in its natural context; it does not derive 
from isolation and purification as it does in the classic human intervention cases. Rather, for 
genetic material and proteins, the effort that patent law is intended to encourage resides in the 
next set of steps that must be undertaken—converting that knowledge through long, intricate, 
and risky experimentation into commercial products.”). 
 196. See id. at 892 (discussing the circumstances when a newly isolated protein can be 
patented); Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1367. 
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to predict how a circuit will function without undergoing any testing 
or experimentation.197 Because of this, the problems that lay in 
designing electrical circuits are problems of creativity; the solutions 
to these problems are creative solutions rather than empirical 
discoveries. Unlike chemistry or biology, therefore, one can conceive 
an invention based on an electrical circuit—from its components to 
predicting how it will function—entirely in the mind. 
The famous patent case of Kearns v. Chrysler Corp. describes this 
principle in the context of the invention of the intermittent 
windshield wiper.198 Prior to Robert Kearns’s invention, all automatic 
windshield wipers in cars continuously wiped a car’s windscreen at a 
constant speed.199 Because the human eye blinks intermittently, 
rather than continuously, this proved some irritation to many drivers, 
including Kearns.200 Kearns, a Wayne State University engineering 
professor, invented a windshield wiper that wiped the windscreen 
intermittently rather than continuously, and obtained a patent for his 
invention in 1967.201 Notably, Kearns’s invention was the simple 
combination of an electrical circuit, motor, and spring, all of which 
had existed in the prior art for decades, and the combination of 
which could easily be predicted by any electrical engineer of even 
mediocre skill.202 While Kearns certainly experimented with his 
invention, the invention itself was a product entirely of Kearns’s 
mind.203 Unlike a chemist or biologist who must experiment with his 
materials to bring his invention in a patent-ready state, once Kearns 
conceived of the appropriate circuit, motor, and spring combination 
 
 197. See Seymore, supra note 175, at 136 (“In electrical engineering, for example, a 
PHOSITA can easily predict what will happen when circuits are combined.”). 
 198. 32 F.3d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The inventor of the intermittent windshield wiper, 
Robert Kearns, brought a large number of relatively successful suits against numerous car 
manufacturers beginning with Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., No. 8-70740 (E.D. Mich. 1978). In 
2008, the subject of these suits was made into a movie, starring Greg Kinnear as Kearns. The 
movie suggested that Kearns came up with the idea of the intermittent windshield wiper 
primarily as a thought experiment, with some, but little, validation at the bench. The movie 
was appropriately named “Flash of Genius.” I confess to having seen it. 
 199. See U.S. Patent No. 3,351,836 (filed Dec 1, 1964) (describing the prior art).  
 200. JOHN SEABROOK, FLASH OF GENIUS: AND OTHER TRUE STORIES OF INVENTION 1 
(2008).  
 201. See id.; U.S. Patent, supra note 199. 
 202. See John Seabrook, The Flash of Genius, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 1993 (Clifford 
Sadler, of Ford’s executive department, is quoted as saying the following about the technology 
behind Kearns’s patent: “Even in 1963, the resistor-capacitor timing device was a standard 
piece of engineering—it was sophomore-in-college stuff.”). 
 203. See SEABROOK, supra note 200, at 7.  
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for his intermittent wipers, he did not need to conduct any further 
experiments before submitting his invention to the patent office. 
These differences in the methods of invention among disciplines 
subject themselves to different treatment in the analogous art 
inquiry. Because inventions made in more laborious disciplines 
typically require more trial-and-error than creative disciplines, the 
solutions to problems in laborious disciplines typically come from a 
narrow range of often-used but related art. The universe of materials 
with which to solve problems is limited, and inventors seeking 
solutions in the more laborious disciplines must often draw on the 
same techniques, repeat familiar methods, and seek inspiration from 
similar sources as previous inventors in the field. This was readily 
apparent with the plaintiff’s invention in Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.204 
There, the inventor’s “trial-and-error” was “routine testing” and 
“routine experimentation.”205 In order to solve the problems of 
chemical stability and the stickiness of the chemical compound to 
machine manufacturing equipment—frequent problems in drug 
manufacturing—the inventor experimented by combining the 
chemical compound, amlodipine, with a number of “acid addition 
salts.”206 The “work on this project was ‘expected to be 
straightforward.’”207 Further, when the inventor selected besylate 
from a variety of salts, it did so because it had “good solubility, . . . 
good stability, nonhygroscopicity and good processability”—all 
“basic considerations by a person skilled in the art for selecting a 
suitable pharmaceutical salt” according to the examiner.208 Although 
these trials took years and not a small amount of research capital to 
complete,209 the procedures and inspirations for finding that 
“perfect” “acid addition salt” were not novel but routine 
experimental tools of the art of pharmaceutical chemistry.210 
The creative disciplines on the other hand can draw upon a 
wider, more diverse range of prior art, precisely because the 
inventions in those disciplines can be primarily formed in the mind. 
 
 204. 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 205. Id. at 1367.  
 206. Id. at 1354. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1355.  
 209. See id. at 1353–54 (recounting Pfizer’s four years of research into inventing 
amlodipine besylate). 
 210. Id. at 1355.  
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The inspiration to solve the problems those inventions address often 
comes from unlikely or far-removed sources. And because such 
inventions can be wholly conceived of, without experiment, the 
universe of materials to bring them into existence is theoretically 
limitless. This, too, was the case with Robert Kearns’s windshield 
wipers. While the materials Kearns used in creating his invention 
were surely the workhorses known to all garage-shop engineers—
circuit, motors, and springs—his inspiration of combining those 
units into a coherent, working whole was far from rote. First, the 
very concept of the intermittent wiper came from principles outside 
the typical realm of electrical engineering: human biology. Kearns 
conceived of the idea for intermittent, as opposed to continuous, 
wipers from the intermittent blinking of the human eye.211 Second, a 
large part of Kearns’s invention was to utilize two aspects of a wet 
car windshield generally unconsidered by electrical engineers: the 
drag forces created by a moving car against the windshield, a 
principle of aerodynamics; and the lubricating force of the wet 
windshield on the wipers, a principle of hydrodynamics.212 Both of 
these principles were integral to the function of the “brake 
resistor”—the critical component in Kearns’s invention that made 
the wipers slow down and seemingly stop, so it would appear that 
they wiped only “intermittently.”213 It is telling, too, that Kearns 
cited only three prior art references in his patent application related 
to electronically controlled windshield wipers.214 Although Kearns 
generally conceived of this process entirely in his mind, the arts he 
drew upon—electrical engineering, human biology, aerodynamics, 
and hydrodynamics—were relatively disparate. 
It is thus more likely, therefore, that an invention created in a 
laborious discipline will be found to consist of “analogous arts” than 
will an invention created in a creative discipline.215 Because invention 
in laborious disciplines requires not just research, experimentation, 
and validation but the same research, experimentation, and validation 
 
 211. See SEABROOK, supra note 200, at 1.  
 212. See U.S. Patent, supra note 199.   
 213. See id.  
 214. Id. (citing U.S. Patent Nos. 2,357,152 (continuous electric windshield wiper), 
3,219,901 (intermittent control of windshield wiper), and 3,262,042 (electronic circuit for 
windshield wiper)). 
 215. See Stadheim, supra note 175, at 150 (“Furthermore, in the electrical and 
mechanical arts, we will have problems with very broad inclusion of analogous art, and with the 
bias against patents for incremental improvements.”) 
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that all inventors in the discipline must use,216 the inspirations and 
solutions to those inventions will routinely draw upon similar, and 
consequently, more “analogous” arts. And because invention in the 
more creative disciplines does not necessarily need to limit itself to 
similar sets of concepts, methods, or ideas,217 inventions in the 
creative disciplines will, relative to inventions in laborious disciplines, 
be less likely to draw on what courts will find to be “analogous” arts. 
It is this effect that contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of § 
103’s decree that “[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the 
manner in which the invention was made.”218 Because the trend of 
analogizing prior art has essentially allowed courts to increase their 
scrutiny over—and invalidate—a number of patents, the analogous 
art test displays a bias against inventions made in laborious disciplines 
relative to inventions made in creative ones. Contrary to § 103, the 
analogous art test, therefore, makes material “whether [the 
invention] resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a 
flash of genius.”219 Put simply, the analogous art test allows courts to 
negative invention “by the manner in which the invention was 
made.”220 
IV. NEGATIVING INVENTION 
The elastic and expansive nature of the analogous arts test 
“negatives” invention in several ways. It negatives inventions of 
precision because those inventions are more likely to draw on prior 
art that could be considered “analogous,” and consequently 
succumb to an obviousness determination. It negatives 
“unpredictable,” and sometimes synergistic inventions, because 
those inventions are more likely to require experimentation and 
 
 216. See Pfizer v. Apotex, 480 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (describing the 
“routine procedures” of analytical testing in chemistry).  
 217. See Barry, supra note 152, at 246–47 (citation omitted) (“In today’s world, 
questions arising in a particular industry are answered not only by those inside the industry but 
by those trained in scientific fields having no ‘necessary relationship’ thereto.”); see generally 
Amy L. Landers, Ordinary Creativity in Patent Law: The Artist Within the Scientist, 75 MO. L. 
REV. 1 (2010) (discussing the role of creativity in invention). 
 218. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 2006). 
 219. See id. (1952 Revision Notes); see also Brown, supra note 175, at 1148 (“[T]he 
Court views patentable subject matter as inventions that are closer toward the ‘flash of genius’ 
end of the inventive spectrum.”); Seymore, supra note 175, at 135 (“Thus, the post-KSR 
PHOSITA is not a plodder but a creative individual.”). 
 220. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a). 
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confirmation using techniques found in “analogous arts.” And, by 
favoring creative-type inventions, which need little capital to invent, 
over toil and experimentation-type inventions, which often need 
greater amounts of research capital, it negatives the principal purpose 
of the patent monopoly: to allow inventors to recoup the costs of 
designing their inventions. 
A. Negativing Inventions of Precision 
Many inventions are inventions of precision rather than 
grandeur; they seek to improve upon the prior art in a discrete and 
minute quantity or quality. An invention for a missile guidance 
system, for example, may seek to improve targeting by only a few 
inches.221 An inverter-controller to regulate electrical currents may 
find the optimal calibration of input to be the difference between 
mere microseconds.222 And, in the life sciences, such as chemistry or 
biology, the difference between a new and useful invention and the 
prior art is, often and literally, a single atom.223 
An analogous arts test that favors inventions made by creative 
flashes of genius over technical plodding at the workbench inherently 
disfavors these inventions of precision. This is because inventions of 
precisions are more often the product of, and require, the sort of 
technical drudgery discouraged by the analogous arts test.224 In 
 
 221. See In re Vaidyanathan, 381 F. App’x 985 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing a rejection for 
a patent application of an increased-precision missile guidance system); GEORGE M. SIOURIS, 
MISSILE GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 645 (2004) (describing “good” accuracy as a 
missile’s “strike within a few feet of its aimpoint”). 
 222. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1356–57 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (adding a 32-microsecond delay to an inverter-controller’s feedback circuit 
over the prior art). 
 223. See, e.g., Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1356 n.4 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (“In fact, a difference of only a single oxygen atom between Example 6 of the ‘902 
patent and olmesartan [the prior art], as noted by [the accused infringer], is of greater 
significance than it superficially appears, as it is the difference between functional groups, 
specifically an isopropyl and a hydroxyisopropyl.”); Singh v. Brake, 317 F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (“[R]eplacing a functional group on a chemical compound can often have highly 
unpredictable results. We noted [previously] that even a change as seemingly trivial as replacing 
an isopropyl group with the isosteric cyclopropyl group at issue in that case could result in 
either a significant improvement or reduction in the activity of the compound against a 
particular biological target.”); see also John C. Stolpa, Comment, Toward Aligning the Law 
with Biotechnology? The Federal Circuit’s About Face in Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 
4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 339, 351 (2003) (discussing precision-of-invention in the 
biotechnology context). 
 224. See Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) 
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Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Matrix Laboratories, Ltd., the only 
improvement the invention at issue, a drug for heart disease, made 
over the prior art was the replacement of a nitrogen atom with an 
oxygen atom in an otherwise complex chemical compound made up 
of dozens of atoms.225 Despite the seeming insignificance of this 
advance, chemical substitutions like those described in Daiichi 
Sankyo often demand years of research.226 The analogous art test 
generally disfavors such inventions because, as with Pfizer v. 
Apotex,227 the methodology behind this research often draws heavily 
upon that already in the prior art.228  
As a further example, the district court in Altana Pharma AG v. 
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., considered a drug patent that 
purported to inhibit the stomach’s natural production of gastric acid 
to alleviate the symptoms of acid reflux disease.229 The patentees 
attempted to create a drug with a specific acid-affinity, or pKa, that 
would only begin dissolving the medication once it reached the 
patient’s stomach.230 The prior art had already determined this pKa 
range: between 1.0 and 5.0.231 But further research was still required. 
It took years to develop a non-toxic, effective, and soluble drug that 
also happened to fall between these pKa values.232 The resulting 
chemical compound was certainly new, useful, and nonobvious, in 
the lay sense of these words, even though it was created through 
rather ordinary and unimaginative processes. An analogous arts test 
that would thwart this invention because it utilized research and 
experimentation techniques typical to the field, to reach a pKa value 
already known from prior research, would be the bane of piquant-
loving gastronomists and pharmaceutical industrialists everywhere.  
 
(“Complex inventions and problems in some cases require laboratory tests that ‘accurately 
duplicate actual working conditions in practical use.’”). 
 225. 619 F.3d at 1350–51.  
 226. See id. at 1347–49 (discussing research programs to develop hydrophilic angiotensin 
receptor blockers).  
 227. 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 228. See notes 187–191 and 204–210 and accompanying text. 
 229. 532 F. Supp. 2d 666, 668 (D.N.J. 2007).  
 230. Id. at 678 (describing the invention as a “compound stable enough to survive 
[some] regions of the body, but not so stable as to be unreactive in the [higher-acidity 
stomach] cells, where the compound needs to react to inhibit acid production”). 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. at 668–71.  
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Sometimes these sorts of inventions, although not pioneering 
inventions created by epiphany, herald great advances in the field 
through simple, incremental improvements.233 In the Daiichi Sankyo 
case, for example, the Federal Circuit noted that the single chemical 
substitution “is of greater significance than it superficially 
appears.”234 The addition of the oxygen molecule to the prior-art 
compound increased the compound’s lipophilicity,235 or ability to 
bind to fats, a critical property in effective drug development.236 As 
the drug in Daiichi Sankyo was developed to prevent heart disease, 
an analogous arts test that would invalidate the compound under a 
Cuno-like determination of obviousness, may mean the difference 
between the patent holder’s continued development of the drug or 
its abandonment—or, to put it extremely, life and death.  If nothing 
else, the differences in outcomes among these cases—Daiichi Sankyo 
(nonobvious), Pfizer (obvious), and Altana Pharma (likely 
obvious)—illustrates the risk to pharmaceutical inventors of relying 
too heavily on traditional trial-and-error research techniques. 
An analogous art test that discriminates against these inventions 
based on their method of invention has the potential to negative 
some of the most important, although ploddingly created, advances. 
Some scholars have been sharply critical of this sort of bias against 
 
 233. See John F. Duffy, The Thirteenth Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial 
Lecture In Intellectual Property Law: Innovation and Recovery, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 237, 241 (2010) (“Many patented innovations are incremental advances that build on 
pre-existing technologies in relatively standard ways. Recognizing this truth does not denigrate 
the value of those innovations and certainly does not suggest that they should be denied patent 
protection. Even on the forefront of scientific research, ‘normal science’ usually dominates, 
with valuable but incremental additions to existing structures.”); Book Note, Biotechnology and 
the Federal Circuit: By Kenneth J. Burchfiel, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 577, 582 (1996) (“[In] the 
useful art of chemical research . . . small incremental inventions may be without commercial 
utility but may still be vital to the development of the field as a whole.”). 
 234. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 235. Id. at 1356 (citation omitted) (“As the district court in this case put it, ‘a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would not select the ‘902 patent compounds as leads only to disregard 
one of their distinguishing characteristics, specifically their increased lipophilicity at the 4-
position.’”). 
 236. BRUCE C. BAGULEY & DAVID J. KERR, ANTICANCER DRUG DEVELOPMENT 270 
(2002) (“Lipophilic character is an important parameter influencing cellular uptake, and while 
hydrophilic drugs may be able to access active carrier mechanisms for cell entry, lipophilic 
drugs equilibrate rapidly by passive diffusion. Lipophilic character is also important in 
determining binding to proteins, which are generally present in serum components of the 
culture medium and which in turn modulate drug uptake by reducing free-drug 
concentrations.”).  
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incremental improvements.237 In discussing the state of the “flash of 
genius” requirement after Cuno, Professor Duffy lauds those “rather 
ordinary engineers who have nothing more than the ‘skill of the 
calling’—with the calling being the engineering of improvements on 
existing technologies.”238 As for the patentability of such advances, 
Duffy counsels that “[i]f, ex ante, the engineers are confronting 
difficult problems with uncertain prospects of finding a solution, 
then the solution—if and when it is found—should be patentable, 
without regard to whether the solution was found by genius or by 
tenacious plodding.”239 
B. Negativing Unpredictable Inventions 
Patent law has long distinguished between “predictable” and 
“unpredictable” inventions.240 Professor Seymore has described 
predictable inventions as those “rooted in well-defined, predictable 
factors.”241 Precisely because the result of predictable inventions can 
be predicted, an inventor can create a predictable invention entirely 
in his mind. He is free to draw upon a wide variety of fields and 
combine elements from these fields as he sees fit, without concern 
that the combination of these elements will lead to unknown or 
 
 237. See, e.g., Alan L. Durham, Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 933, 957 n.207 (2000) (“With some sense of irony, courts often contrast 
groundbreaking, invaluable, but unpatentable discoveries in natural science with humble, 
incremental, but patentable advancements in technology.”); J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips 
and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 
1744 (2000) (discussing, generally, “[h]ow to enable entrepreneurs to appropriate the fruits of 
their investments in cumulative and sequential innovation without impeding follow-on 
innovation and without creating barriers to entry”); Stadheim, supra note 175, at 150 
(“Furthermore, in the electrical and mechanical arts, we will have problems with very broad 
inclusion of analogous art, and with the bias against patents for incremental improvements.”). 
 238. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 42 (citation omitted); see also Duffy, supra note 233, at 
241. 
 239. Duffy, supra note 4, at 42.  
 240. See, e.g., In re Crounse, 363 F.2d 881, 884 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (discussing 
obviousness against applicant’s contention that his invention was unpredictable); see also 
Landers, supra note 217, at 38–42 (discussing the unpredictability of the inventive process); 
Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185, 194–95 (2009) (discussing the concept of 
“serendipity” in unpredictable technologies); Seymore, supra note 175, at 136–39 (discussing 
predictable and unpredictable arts); Stadheim, supra note 175, at 150–51 (discussing 
obviousness in the context of the predictability of electrical engineering inventions); Stolpa, 
supra note 223, at 151 (“The [USPTO] Guidelines make a clear distinction between 
technologies that are new and unpredictable and those that are established.”). 
 241. Seymore, supra note 175, at 136 (discussing predictable and unpredictable arts). 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011  1:41 PM 
1091 Negativing Invention 
 1131 
unexpected results. Unpredictable inventions are inherently limited 
in this regard. If an inventor seeks to use elements far removed from 
her field—sometimes even in a closely related field—she will not be 
able to predict the result of that combination of elements. As such, 
she will need to engage in a “set of routine, well-established 
formulae”242 to determine her invention’s result. Those “routine, 
well-established formulae” are more likely to be analogous arts. 
Several cases demonstrate this at work. 
In Oetiker, the metal clamp-garment clamp case, the Federal 
Circuit reversed the PTO’s conclusion that a prior art reference, 
describing a plastic clamp in garments was analogous to the 
patentee’s invention using a metal clamp for hoses.243 The 
invention’s effects, however, were likely predictable: the patentee’s 
hose clamps surely did not yield any surprising or unexpected results. 
Indeed, according to the court, it was a simple improvement on the 
inventor’s earlier hose-clamp invention.244 But the inventor’s 
addition of a “preassembly hook,” a hook that supposedly 
maintained the form of the clamp before its first use and disengaged 
upon the user’s first clamping, was nonetheless a creative and yet 
simple way to solve an apparent manufacturing problem.245 
More recently, in K-Tec, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., the plaintiff sued 
for infringement of its patent for powerful blenders.246 The invention 
improved upon the blending jar to reduce “cavitation,” or the 
formation of air pockets caused by the movement of the blender’s 
blades—long a problem in the blending art.247 According to both the 
plaintiff and the defendant, cavitation is the artifact responsible for 
“freeze up,” or incomplete blending in smoothie making.248 To solve 
these problems, the inventor used several design solutions to reduce 
 
 242. See Landers, supra note 217, at 38 (“[A] distinction may be drawn between 
predictable processes and the unpredictable results of that process. For example, one may apply 
a set of routine, well-established formulae to test a hypothesis that yields surprising—and 
therefore creative—results.”). 
 243. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1446–47 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  
 244. Id. at 1446.  
 245. Id. at 1447.  
 246. 729 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314–15 (D. Utah 2010). The plaintiff K-Tec, now 
Blendtec, is the maker of the “Total Blender,” a home blender powerful enough to successfully 
blend iPods, sneakers, and golf clubs, among other household goods, as demonstrated online. 
See WILL IT BLEND?, http://www.willitblend.com (last visited Jul. 31, 2011). 
 247. K-Tec, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1317, 1326. 
 248. Id. at 1326. 
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cavitation that were otherwise well-known in other hydrodynamic 
fields.249 For this creative combination of fields, which yielded at least 
arguably predictable results, the court nonetheless granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiff on the issue of validity.250 It found that the 
defendant’s asserted prior art references, mainly to food storage 
units, were nonanalogous because they were not within the field of 
the plaintiff’s endeavor.251 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, 
Inc., on the other hand, demonstrates a court’s willingness to 
analogize prior art for unpredictable inventions that arise from 
diligent plodding at the lab bench rather than flashes of creative 
genius.252 Prior to the invention in Daiichi Sankyo v. Apotex, 
medications for ear infections caused by bacteria, or otological 
infections, posed some health risks; in some instances, the 
medications caused deafness in the treated ear.253 This was primarily 
because the medications could only be used for certain ear 
infections254 difficult for practitioners and pediatricians to 
diagnose.255 
To solve this problem, the inventor in Daiichi Sankyo v. Apotex 
sought to create a drug that was sufficiently safe, efficacious, and 
simple to prescribe, facilitating prescription by treating physicians 
rather than specialists.256 After finding a potential drug candidate, 
Daiichi Sankyo then performed a series of toxicity and efficacy tests 
on animals and eventually patented the drug, ofloxacin.257 Like other 
 
 249. Id. at 1321. 
 250. Id. at 1327. 
 251. Id. at 1321, 1327. 
 252. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 253. See Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678 (D.N.J. 
2006), rev’d, Daiichi Sankyo Co., 501 F.3d at 1254. 
 254. See id. (discussing the medical condition, otitis externa). 
 255. See PETER ROBB & ALEX WATSON, ENT IN PRIMARY CARE 41 (2007) (discussing 
the need for referrals in cases of otitis externa); see also DALE BERG, ADVANCED CLINICAL 
SKILLS AND PHYSICAL DIAGNOSIS 36 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the difference between otitis 
externa and otitis externa maligna). 
 256. See Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., 441 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (“Prior to the time of 
[Daiichi Pharmaceutical’s] patent, none of the available ototopical eardrop preparations were 
free from the ototoxic safety concern. All of the otic formulations for ear drops listed in the 
Physicians Desk Reference . . . carried contraindications to their use in the face of a nonintact 
ear drum.”) (citations omitted). 
 257. Id. at 679 (“Daiichi began conducting tests to establish the safety and efficacy of 
ofloxacin.”); id. at 680 n.16. 
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drugs in the field, ofloxacin worked by inhibiting a bacterial enzyme, 
gyrase, that allowed bacterial replication.258 After Apotex threatened 
to manufacture a generic version of the drug, Daiichi Sankyo 
brought suit against Apotex for infringement.259 
Apotex sought to invalidate the patent by asserting several prior 
art references directed at otologists.260 One taught using another 
gyrase inhibitor, ciproflaxin, but cautioned that it “should be used 
only in difficult cases and exclusively by the otologist.”261 The 
District Court concluded that because Daiichi Sankyo’s invention 
was specifically directed to making gyrase inhibitors safe for 
prescription by general practice physicians, the ciproflaxin reference, 
which specifically limited itself to otologists, did not render Daiichi 
Sankyo’s compound obvious.262 
The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed, concluding that, 
although the purpose of the invention was to put ear medications in 
the hands of general practitioners, the applicable field of endeavor 
was ear specialists with a background in drug development.263 As 
such, the appellate court concluded that the ciproflaxin reference, 
with its exclusive call to otologists, was an invalidating prior art.264 
The court’s basis for recentering the field of endeavor, and by 
consequence, any analogous arts, was not grounded in any similarity 
between general practitioners and specialists. Rather, it based its 
conclusion on the fact that Daiichi Sankyo had performed animal 
safety testing on its invention, something it considered “outside the 
realm of a general practitioner or pediatrician.”265  
In effect, the Federal Circuit held Daiichi Sankyo’s testing 
against it in its review of the analogous art; because Daiichi Sankyo 
had performed safety research routine to one field, the field of 
endeavor, and consequently, the prior art, must fully encompass that 
field as well. The court noted Daiichi Sankyo’s contention that the 
research was required because “[o]ne cannot extrapolate a safety 
profile for one antibiotic to another,” but dismissed its objections as 
 
 258. Id. at 682–83. 
 259. Id. at 676. 
 260. Id. at 686–87. 
 261. Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 262. Id. at 689–90. 
 263. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 264. Id. at 1258–59. 
 265. Id. at 1257. 
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unsupported.266 The court, therefore, analogized two arts—general 
practice medicine and otological drug development—not on the 
basis of any intrinsic similarities between them, but because the 
plaintiff performed research, required by the invention’s 
unpredictable nature, that was routine in another field, even though 
the art in that field taught away from the intended use of the 
invention. 
C. Negativing the Purpose of the Patent Monopoly 
Perhaps the principal purpose of the patent monopoly—that is, 
allowing a patentee to exclude others from practicing his invention—
is to allow the inventor to recoup his development costs.267 Often, 
this requires some research—often costly research—on the part of 
the inventor.268 As the invention becomes more complex, the 
research required to bring the invention to a patent-ready state 
typically increases. Consequently, the costs of that research should 
increase as well. As the complexity of an invention increases, 
therefore, the incentives behind the patent monopoly become more 
fully realized: the more costly an invention is to invent, the more 
defensible the patent monopoly’s purpose in allowing the inventor to 
recoup costs in making the invention. 
In Scott v. Finney, for example, the Federal Circuit hinted at this 
problem: “Complex inventions and problems in some cases require 
laboratory tests that accurately duplicate actual working conditions in 
practical use.”269 It contrasted this with “[l]ess complex inventions 
and problems [that] do not demand such stringent testing.”270 
 
 266. Id. at 1259 n.3.  
 267. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 517 
(2010) (“Under a standard economic understanding, the basic purpose of a patent is to enable 
a rights holder to price above marginal cost so that the rights holder has a greater opportunity 
to recoup costs of developing or disseminating the invention.”).  
 268. See, e.g., David M. Treadway, Comment, Has the Supreme Court Forgotten the 
Patentee? Recent Patent Licensing Decisions Contradict Patent Policy, Harm Licensors, and 
Alter Negotiation, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 303, 319 (2008) (“Many industries, especially ones 
with high development costs, depend on strong patent protection to ensure that investors 
recoup development costs necessary to create new products.”). 
 269. 34 F.3d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Elmore v. Schmitt, 278 F.2d 510, 513 (C.C.P.A. 1960).  
 270. Id.  
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“[T]he character of the testing,” the court explained, “varies with 
the character of the invention and the problem it solves.”271 
This “character of the invention” can be drawn across the 
spectrum of inventiveness. On one end lies inventions created by a 
“flash of creative genius”; on the other, plodding inventions 
discovered only by “long toil and experimentation.” Because 
inventions that reside on the flash-of-creative-genius end of the 
spectrum are typically products of the mind,272 they require little 
actual research. The only thing required to bring such inventions 
into being—and into the patent office—is the inventor’s 
inventiveness. Inventions on the opposite end of the inventive 
spectrum, however, inherently require such research. It is difficult to 
envision an invention residing on the long-toil-and-experimentation 
end of the spectrum that does not, in fact, require long toil and 
experimentation. Under this rubric, flash-of-genius inventions “do 
not demand such stringent testing”273 as long-toil-and-
experimentation inventions that may “require laboratory tests that 
accurately duplicate actual working conditions in practical use.”274 
Consequently, inventions created by more laborious research 
methods should, on the whole, cost more to bring to patentability 
than inventions created by more whimsical means. 
An analogous art test that vitiates § 103’s dictate against 
negativing patentability based on the method of invention does not 
follow this principal purpose of the patent monopoly. By 
discriminating against inventions made by long toil and 
experimentation in favor of inventions conceived of by flashes of 
genius, the analogous art test will increasingly invalidate higher-cost 
inventions in favor of lower-cost inventions. By doing so, inventors 
who have spent more capital developing their inventions, for whom 
the patent monopoly is directed, are less likely to recoup their costs 
than inventors who have spent little to no capital developing theirs. 
The design of semiconductor chips, for example, provides sharp 
focus to this claim. Advances to semiconductor chips are measured 
by speed, determined by the layout or “architecture” of electrical 
elements on those chips—pins, resistors, transistors, capacitors—that 
 
 271. Id.  
 272. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 273. See Scott, 34 F.3d at 1062. 
 274. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Elmore, 278 F.2d at 513). 
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define that speed.275 Semiconductor manufacturers must expend 
enormous amounts of capital in research and development to 
increase the speed of their semiconductors.276 But while these 
advances to chip architecture are generally patentable, both Congress 
and scholars have construed these advances to be, at least according 
to traditional patent law canons, “rarely inventive.”277 The lack of 
inventiveness attributed to semiconductor design is, in no small part, 
due to the analogous art test: because all of the same electrical 
elements are present on every semiconductor—pins, resistors, 
transistors, and capacitors—any suggestion of a differing 
arrangement typically comes from teachings in an analogous art.278 
Further, once a patentable advance in chip architecture is made, it is 
easy for a competitor to obtain the benefit of that advance by reverse 
engineering the chip and making a slight, noninfringing modification 
to its design.279 As such, semiconductor manufacturers risk their 
research capital on two fronts: at the patent office and in the open 
marketplace. While Congress eased this burden on semiconductor 
manufacturers with the passage of the Semiconductor Chip 
Protection Act,280 the analogous art test’s discriminatory effect on 
research-intensive fields with a narrow field of prior art lives on. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite a seeming historical trend to the contrary, patent law still 
concerns itself with the manner in which inventions are made. 
Obviousness analysis, codified in the patent statute in 1952, requires 
 
 275. See Kate Greene, Novel Chip Architecture Could Extend Moore’s Law, TECH. REV. 
(Jan. 16, 2007), available at http://www.technologyreview.com/infotech/18063/ 
(discussing chip architecture and speed performance). 
 276. See Michael Riordan, The Incredible Shrinking Transistor, TECH. REV. (Nov. 1, 
1997), available at http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/11620/. 
 277. Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & J.H. Reichman, A 
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 
2346 (1994) (“[S]emiconductor chip[] . . . industrial designs are rarely inventive. Congress 
recognized that the chip industry's products were both patentable and vulnerable to rapid 
imitative copying that undermined innovators' ability to recoup research and development 
costs; this undermined incentives to make the substantial investments necessary to develop new 
chip designs.”). 
 278. See Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 114, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 279. See Samuelson et al., supra note 277, at 2346. 
 280. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–914 (2006); see Samuelson et al., supra note 277, at 2400 
nn.379–81 (discussing the act). 
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the courts to assess all prior art “pertinent” to the field of the 
invention, i.e., the “analogous arts.” What an “analogous art” is 
however, is left up to the courts to define. Unfortunately, few 
general principles, if any, as to how a court should reach a 
determination of “analogousness” can be gleaned from cases 
addressing the issue.  
Because technology has become increasingly interdisciplinary, 
courts have extended what they consider to be analogous arts far 
beyond those conceived of in the adoption of the obviousness 
statute. This trend towards analogizing prior arts discriminates 
against inventions made by more research-focused methods over 
those made by creative flashes of genius, because the methods used 
to create such empirically driven inventions are more likely to be 
considered analogous arts than arts collected for invention in more 
creative-type inventions. This progression of analogous arts 
jurisprudence has three effects: One, it increasingly negatives 
inventions of precision. Two, it invalidates patents in inventions 
where synthesis and utility are generally unpredictable. And three, it 
discourages inventors from recouping the cost of research-expensive 
inventions—the very purpose of the patent monopoly.  
While an analogous arts test that negatives invention in this 
manner may not be wholly unworkable—or removable, given its 
historical pedigree—courts should be wary of these effects in their 
decisions to analogize prior arts, and cabin their analysis 
appropriately. 
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